World War I mine craters in Latgale and Sēlia

In September 1916, mine battles took place 5.5 km south of Ilūkste, in an area known as “Mid Hill.” During this period, the section north of the Daugavpils–Liepāja railway line was occupied by the 38th Infantry Division of the 19th Corps of the Russian Army.

The "Mid Hill", rising 5 meters above a marshy lowland, attracted the attention of the corps commander during one of his visits to the positions. The order was given: "to establish a foothold on this high ground". The tactical importance of the hill was such that it provided an opportunity to shell the approaches to the German front trenches in the north and south directions with rifle and machine gun fire.

The importance of the “middle hill” was also appreciated by the Germans, who began to systematically bombard it with artillery and mortar fire. Using the traffic passage from the trenches, the Russians managed to capture the hill. A small trench was built on it - at first for a half-company, and then for the needs of the company. Machine guns were installed on the flanks of the position. By September 1916, the trench already had a full profile, it was equipped with several armored buildings, machine gun nests and connected to the rear with a communication road, which was reinforced with sacks and partially adapted for defense on the southern

in the direction.

On the night of 24-25 September, a report was received at the division headquarters that noise could be heard periodically north of the hill, at the junction with the 17th Division, probably from enemy underground works. Artillery fire on the hill became more frequent. During the day, miners from the 2nd Company of the 19th Sapper Battalion organized listening posts, finding out that the enemy did not seem to be carrying out mine works on the “Mid Hill”. It was assumed that such could be heard towards the “Ferdinand Nose” further north - although it was difficult to determine the exact direction and distance to the underground works: the Germans, by conducting intensified artillery fire, camouflaged their underground works.

This continued until September 26, when at 9:00 in the morning, the Germans, after 10 minutes of shelling on the hill, blew up their mine tunnel, and about 10 steps from the Russian trench created a crater with a diameter of about 60 meters and a depth of 5 meters. After the explosion, the Germans rushed to occupy the crater, but were driven off by rifle and machine gun fire. The Russian soldiers managed to occupy the nearest edge of the crater, where they dug in until evening. The mine battle began.

On the same day, in accordance with the order of the division commander, the commander of the 2nd sapper company, Captain Radkevich, began organizing anti-mine work on the “Middle Hill”. The situation clearly indicated that: 1) the Germans decided to get rid of the “Middle Hill” that was bothering them with a mine attack (having made sure that they would not be able to dislodge the Russian sentries with fire alone), but they did not dare to take the trench by open force, fearing serious human losses); 2) in order to distract attention, they began underground work from the side of “Ferdinandov’s Nose”, demonstratively working louder at this stage (on the middle hill they drowned out the noise of the work with grenade launchers and grenade launcher shots).

After the explosion of the German mine tunnel, Captain Radkevich, intensifying his listening, ordered his minelayers to create two mine galleries: one in the northwest direction, dividing it into three branches to intercept the enemy's underground works, and the other as an underground communication towards Crater No. 1, from which it was planned to descend again (using mine shafts) with anti-mine branches to listen and intercept the German galleries.

From September 26, the delivery of boards for the construction of mine tunnels was organized. On the morning of September 27, the post located in crater No. 1 was safely hidden behind earth bags and steel shields. The guard post was connected to the trench by an underground communication tunnel located at a depth of 3-4 meters. By this time, the sappers had cleared the end of the German gallery that had collapsed in the crater and determined that it led approximately in the direction of blockhouse "B", which was hidden in the bushes. No traces of work were found in the gallery, but from time to time the noise of a water pump was heard.

On the night of September 27, listening from the northern edge of crater No. 1 and well No. 1, German works were discovered, carried out against the northern end of the Russian trench on the hill: from time to time noise was heard. On September 27 at 5:10 a.m. the Germans blew up a second crater - slightly weaker than the first. Crater No. 2 was formed, north (right) of crater No. 1, opposite the northern corner of the trench - with a diameter of about 50 meters and a depth of about 4 meters.

The Russian minelayer had a difficult task to perform - to block the enemy's minelayers' access to their underground positions underground and to wrest the initiative from the enemy. The latter task was especially difficult, since in the current situation the Germans, having worked for at least two weeks, had overcome a distance of 100-170 meters. Taking into account the condition of the soil and the topographic data of the area, Captain Radkevich decided that the Germans could only dig tunnels in two directions (from the end of the "A" defensive line and the side of the "B" blockhouse and from the side of the V blockhouse), and decided to continue digging the countermine gallery, which had been started from well No. 1, towards blockhouse "B". At the same time, he gave the order to start digging a new well No. 3 at the southern end of the Russian trench, from which a countermine gallery with branches would be led towards the end of the enemy trench A and to the southwest, crossing the German gallery No. 1, which led from blockhouse "B". Thus, a whole anti-mine system had to appear in the south and northwest directions.

The listening revealed that the Germans were continuing their work in their gallery No. 2 and, apparently, were building new branches No. 3 and No. 5 from gallery No. 1 and branch No. 6 from gallery No. 4. In the indicated directions, noises were detected that resembled the movement of wagons, the operation of engines and the bubbling of water. The Russian work, which was carried out only by hand, continued - the mine destroyers, who worked continuously in three shifts, were assisted by workers from the infantry (up to 8 people per gallery per shift). The mine tunnels were prepared by sappers, and they were delivered to the galleries by infantry.

On September 30, at 5 a.m., the Germans detonated a third mine, which created crater No. 3 at the southern exit corner of the Russian trench—the nearest ridge edge 12 paces from the last crater. The explosion was apparently quite powerful, as the crater was 60 meters in diameter and about 6 meters deep. The explosion, however, was incomplete, as more than 300 kg of unexploded “carbonite” in 4-inch cubes was later found in the crater. The Germans probably hoped to use a powerful mine to simultaneously blow up the southern end of the Russian trench and cover up the Russian anti-mine galleries. But the anti-mine network prevented them from getting close enough to the trench, and the Russian galleries also suffered little from the enemy mine explosion. Craters No. 3, like the previous ones, was occupied by a Russian ambush, and the sappers, despite enemy fire, began exploring the German gallery in order to check its direction and, according to the data obtained, change the direction of the works.

By this time, craters No. 1 and No. 2 had already been connected to the traffic passage, the underground passages from well No. 2 had been completed, and from well No. 4 in crater No. 1 a gallery was created to the German gallery No. 1 - for listening purposes. Continuing mine work and listening from the galleries that came out of wells No. 1 and No. 3, it became clear that the assumptions were correct: the Germans carried out underground works directly in the direction of the Russian galleries, but avoided the latter, trying to bypass them and go out directly to the guard trench. On the night of October 6, German branch No. 7 was found, and a 655 kg charge of tola and black powder was placed at the end of the Russian gallery, which was opposite this branch - it was detonated at 5.00 in the morning, destroying the German branch No. 1a.

On October 6, another German tunnel was found, leading from the enemy's gallery No. 1. And Russian minelayers installed a mine (2 A) with the same amount of explosives at the end of the gallery leading from well No. 3. The explosion, which sounded at 7 p.m., destroyed the German galleries No. 5 and No. 6.

Listening revealed a faint noise in the German galleries No. 1 and No. 2: water pumping, engine work and the movement of wagons were heard. It was established that the enemy was carrying out work in the direction of the German gallery No. 4. And the Russian minelayers installed a third mine – the same size as the two previous ones – on the end of the branch of the gallery, which separated from the gallery that came out of the well No. 3. On October 9, at 14:00, the backfilling was completed, and at 14:15, the explosion destroyed the enemy gallery. So, in all the most important directions, the initiative passed into the hands of the Russian minelayers. The Germans understood this, and at about 15:00 on October 10, with the help of two successive powerful underground explosions (camouflages No. 1b and No. 2b), they destroyed their main gallery No. 1 and No. 2 knots, putting obstacles to Russian access to their mine system.

By early November, the Germans abandoned further underground mine action.