Formation of the local team in 1944.

Selecting regiment commanders was not difficult for us. There were enough officers in the local Selection Committee who would not hesitate to sacrifice themselves to fulfill their duties if necessary. One of them was Col. Lt. Šepetys, who had already shown his character when he went with the battalion to Trakai. The second was Col. T. Vidugiris, the then commandant of our Panevėžys County. He was the commander of Panevėžys County for some time and proved that the Germans could not break his Lithuanian spirit. For this, he was dismissed from that position.

The general summoned Col. Vidugiris to the headquarters, gave him the necessary instructions, and he immediately left for Sviriai and took over all our battalions stationed in the eastern part of the Vilnius region. (While sitting with him in the Salaspils concentration camp, Vidugiris told me how he had carried out the general's instructions; his first order to battalion commanders upon receiving each of his orders was to check his signature. If the order was signed: "Col. Vidugiris" - everything is in order, and the order is to be executed, but the signature: "Col. Tomas Vidugiris" - means that the regiment commander is forced to give that order, but the battalion commander is not obliged to execute it, but must act according to the circumstances. So we had to resort to such measures to defend ourselves against German provocations).

The Germans are again pressuring us about mobilization. Their struggle with Gen. Plekhavich continues with all its intensity. Projects change projects, ideas change ideas. Meetings are held now at Hinze's, now at our headquarters, now at the General Commissariat. The Germans are strictly demanding: give us the people! We are arguing that under the current conditions we cannot give those people.

After the general's trip to the commander of the Northern Front, we convened a meeting of all our senior officers and generals at the headquarters. Everyone gladly responded to our invitation, showed keen interest in the material we had, but, as expected, everyone unanimously declared that under the current circumstances, mobilization would not be successful.

The Germans' main argument was the Local Draft. For the right to have it, Lithuania must declare mobilization and provide the front with so many thousands of men. The basis for mobilization is a trifle: the General Commissariat will immediately announce the relevant Lithuanian laws, and the general, relying on them, can call up men. But that trifle turned out to be not such a trifle. The General Commissariat gathered our military jurists and instructed them to edit the relevant Lithuanian laws so that they could immediately be used as the basis for declaring mobilization. And they received an answer: mobilization is declared solely to defend the freedom and independence of Lithuania. It is unacceptable to the Germans. The Germans twisted those laws both one way and the other - everything still works without those words, but not the Lithuanian law. And it remained that way.

The announcement of mobilization without the corresponding Lithuanian laws is a new German demand. But what does it mean? According to one German decree, only those of our laws that have been approved by the Germans are valid, according to another, those that do not contradict the existing order. And the law to defend the freedom and independence of Lithuania? It has not been approved by the Germans and, it seems, “slightly” contradicts the existing order. But it has already gone too far to stop because of some “formalities”. Mobilization must be announced based on Lithuanian laws, and what those laws are – let the one who will be called up decide.

And in the opinion of the then VLIK, this was the best solution: the mobilization was announced by a private person, not supported by any more authoritative bodies; the mobilization would clearly not succeed, because no one would stop, so at least time would be gained. Meanwhile, events were unfolding at such a speed that, relatively speaking, a short time could bring about sudden and unexpected changes.

The mobilization preparations begin at the headquarters. The head of the III Department begins to prepare a mobilization schedule and rules for carrying out the mobilization. Piles of all kinds of rules are written, conscription commissions and conscription plans are formed.

The largest series of figures illustrate the process of conscription by year of birth and place of residence. Calculations are made of men, conscripts for each conscription commission, etc. The head of this department knows what he wants and what goal he is pursuing. He does not need any instructions or instructions, and it is dangerous to talk about such things in public. Once, having asked him how long he thought it would take to complete the conscription, and having received the answer that in about a couple of years ... - I was convinced that this work was in the right hands. After that, boldly, almost without checking, I signed everything that the head of the III department handed me. I did not even talk to the general about this matter. We seemed to understand each other too well.

The day of the mobilization announcement is approaching, and so is the end of our game with the Germans. It was clear that mobilization would not yield any results, but the Germans were to blame. It was necessary to speak, write, shout, constantly remind them of our main agreement and the previous Riga resolutions, while at the same time pointing out the constant violation of those agreements on their part. We had a reason to act this way. Already at that meeting in Vilnius, Jeckeln demanded the general’s recall text for the mobilization announcement. I was ready and had with me a summary of his main ideas, hastily written by the general. I give it to him. Jeckeln reads, shrugs, continues reading again. “This is impossible!” he says and reads again. Finally he begins to attack me, tries to prove the correctness of his position. He denies everything. We, however, must give people, and that is the end of our task. The further, the sharper the tone of the conversation becomes. Finally, the meeting is adjourned and a one-hour recess is announced. In his speech, Jeckeln made it clear to me that all circumstances have already changed so much that there is no point in talking about any agreements. When the recess is over, he hands me a piece of paper with the following written on it: “Steigen. Plechavičius’ speech. You will give it to him and tell him that I want him to declare this revocation as his own.” You will do nothing – I took it and put it in my briefcase.

The general, having listened to my report, went to the General Commissariat and declared that he would not accept anyone “teasing” him like a child, that he had never used such service in his life. So, in such circumstances, when all the promises made are broken, when agreements are not kept, he would refuse to announce mobilization. He said goodbye and left.

We discussed what to do at the headquarters. It would not be possible to demobilize the Local Reserve so quickly, and besides, the Germans would not allow it. It was also impossible to transfer it to other hands, because it was already clear who the candidate for the position of commander of the Local Reserve was. The general made a phone call, the people he had summoned came. He himself left the headquarters, then returned again, his phone rang non-stop. A whole line of people wanted to see him.

After some time, the situation became clear. Having invited me to his office, the general roughly formulated the conclusions of his consultations with representatives of our society: relations with the Germans should not be severed under any circumstances. We need to decide how to get out of the current situation. The local Renkots should not be handed over to anyone - that is, there is no need to think about the attitude. It is also planned that the Renkots can be liquidated by violence. During such a liquidation, there will be victims, they are inevitable, but those victims will clearly show everyone that we cannot deal with the Germans, which is important because, given the ever-approaching danger from the Bolsheviks, more and more people are appearing who believe that it will be possible to defend ourselves against the Reds with the help of the Germans. Therefore, mobilization can be announced with complete confidence, because its failure is certain.

After listening to the general, I will be honest, I thought a little. We not only thought about the liquidation of the Local Selection by violence, but we also talked about it at headquarters. But only among ourselves. Now this idea came from abroad, and the impression was much stronger. Catastrophe, liquidation, victims... How easily those words are pronounced, but not so easily experienced. But there is no turning back, we need to move on.

It was no longer necessary to think about how we would resume negotiations with the Germans. Even during our meeting with the general, the first German parliamentarian arrived at the headquarters - the head of the political department of the General Commissariat, von Staden. After a while, the second - von Fritse. And the "song" begins again from the beginning.

Hinze takes back the text of the speech written by Jeckeln and declares that it was a misunderstanding, that no one intends to constrain the general, that he has complete freedom to write his speech as he sees fit, etc. The general re-edits his original text of the speech and hands it to Hinze. After a while — the whole speech again from the beginning: both that is not appropriate, and that it is supposedly impossible to include. The general's statement that the promises he made remain in force, that a Lithuanian leadership is being formed, etc., meets with the most fierce resistance. Hinze is talking to us here, to Riga here, but he is not successful in persuading Jeckeln. The latter strictly forbids him from including those words in the general's speech. Then the general officially informs him in a report that, taking this into account, taking into account a whole series of specifically listed facts, he refuses to take responsibility for the success of the conscription of the men and demands a written confirmation of receipt of this report. In addition, he demands that Hinze confirm to him in writing that these prohibitions are being carried out on direct orders from Jeckeln. Hinze agrees and sends the General Staff's report and the letter we requested.

Finally, the day of the mobilization announcement is set. It was in the first days of May. That day is approaching.